

1960
Vol. I

UNITED NATIONS: 1945-1960

by

Buel W. Patch

	Page
UNITED NATIONS IN CONCEPT AND PRACTICE	441
Crippling of Security Council by the Cold War	442
Increased Importance of the General Assembly	444
Growth in Membership; Bloc Voting in Assembly	446
Functions of United Nations Secretary General	448
United Nations Economic and Social Activities	449
WORK TO KEEP PEACE AND CURB AGGRESSION	451
Council Action to Prevent or Stop Hostilities	451
Resistance to Aggression in Korea and at Suez	453
Inability to Help Hungary's Freedom Fighters	455
Soviet Union's Charges Against United States	456
PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN UNITED NATIONS	457
Problem of Veto; Bar to Revision of Charter	457
Controversial Question of Admitting Red China	459
Far Goals of Disarmament and U.N. Police Force	460

No. 23
June 20

THE right to reproduce material contained in *Editorial Research Reports* is strictly reserved to the newspaper clients of the service. Verbatim use of such material by others will be permitted only upon written authorization.

RICHARD M. BOECKEL, *Editor*

BUEL W. PATCH, *Associate Editor*

Editorial Research Reports
1156 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington

UNITED NATIONS: 1945-1960

COLLAPSE of the scheduled mid-May summit conference at Paris may impel the great nations of the world to put renewed reliance on more firmly established methods of international intercourse. Diplomatic missions have long been maintained in capitals of friendly nations primarily to serve as channels of communication and instruments of negotiation. Fifteen years ago the United Nations came on the scene with various organs especially designed to facilitate settlement of international disputes and to promote cooperation in matters of concern to the world community. If the summit failure causes the big powers increasingly to seek adjustment of their differences through the United Nations, it will at least have helped to forward purposes subscribed to by the 50 nations who signed the U.N. Charter at San Francisco on June 26, 1945.

Former President Truman, who at San Francisco that day called the Charter "a solid structure upon which we can build a better world," said after the recent episode at Paris that he thought no further summit meetings could be held except under the auspices of the United Nations.¹ U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld already had pointed, in a statement on May 19, to the special advantages in this respect offered by the United Nations.

The organization provides the framework for public diplomacy and for conference diplomacy on any level which governments may desire. But it does so as part of a regular procedure, without the building up of both expectations and problems in the way which it is difficult to avoid in such other approaches as tend to make of the negotiations pioneering initiatives of a unique character. . . . The organization provides also the framework for continued non-publicized negotiations in which it is possible to play on the whole range of approaches which have grown out of the experience of traditional diplomacy.

President Eisenhower, always reluctant to utilize the

¹ Copyrighted newspaper article, May 27, 1960. For Soviet torpedoing of projected summit meeting at the United Nations two years ago, see "Conference Diplomacy," *E.R.R.*, 1958 Vol. II, pp. 611-612.

Editorial Research Reports

spectacular summit approach to international negotiation, said in the first year of his administration that the United Nations represented "man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield."² Vice President Richard M. Nixon, addressing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Council on May 31, a fortnight after the summit collapse, declared that it was time to give up summitry and go back to traditional methods of diplomacy and to discussions within the United Nations.

Today, 15 years after its founding, the United Nations has grown into an organization counting 82 member countries. Its record includes both conspicuous accomplishments and conspicuous failures; it mobilized resistance to Communist aggression in Korea, for example, but its efforts to bring about arms limitation have got nowhere. Development of the principal U.N. organs has veered sharply from the preordained pattern; the Security Council, expected to have the prestige and power to enforce peace, has been disabled by indiscriminate use of the veto power and in consequence overshadowed by the General Assembly. The International Court of Justice has had few cases to settle, primarily because of the reluctance of the United States and other nations to accord it as full jurisdiction as intended. On the other hand, the work of U.N. specialized agencies in a variety of economic and social fields has attained wider scope and greater success than seemed probable at the outset.

CRIPPLING OF SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE COLD WAR

The Security Council, on which the Charter bestowed primary responsibility for maintenance of peace, is composed of five permanent members—United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and (Nationalist) China—and six members elected by the General Assembly for terms of two years. Decisions require an affirmative vote of at least seven members, and on matters of substance as distinct from matters of procedure the affirmative votes must include those of the permanent members; the so-called right of veto is exercised when a permanent member, by casting a negative vote, prevents adoption of a resolution which otherwise has the necessary support.³

² Remarks to United States Committee for United Nations Day, Sept. 23, 1953.

³ Although the Charter technically requires the concurring votes of all permanent members on a question of substance, the Council since 1947 has not counted abstention from voting by a permanent member as a veto.

United Nations: 1945-1960

The Council was authorized by the Charter to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might give rise to a dispute, likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; to make recommendations for peaceful settlement; and to enforce its decisions by ordering application of non-military sanctions or by taking "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Members of the United Nations were obligated by the Charter to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council. To insure prompt application of military sanctions, the Council was to have at its disposal armed forces to be held in readiness by member states under special agreements to be negotiated with the Council through its Military Staff Committee. By thus putting armed forces under the independent control of the Council, framers of the Charter hoped to make the United Nations far more effective than the old League of Nations had been as a guardian of the peace.

Opening almost at once of a widening fissure between the free world and the Communist world doomed these hopes to disappointment. Successful operation of the peace machinery incorporated in the Charter depended on unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council. The necessity for unanimity, though stressed most vigorously by the Soviet Union, was recognized implicitly by the other great powers. It was conceded that the Security Council, even with armed forces at its disposal, would be able to halt only relatively minor conflicts. It would not have the strength, until there had been far-reaching disarmament, forcibly to halt outright aggression by a great power regardless of the right of that power to veto punitive action against itself.

The much-criticized veto privilege was originally proposed by the United States, at the Yalta conference, and it may be questioned whether American membership in the United Nations could have won Senate approval without some such provision.⁴ As the great powers, upon whom the main burden of enforcing peace would fall, said in a joint statement at San Francisco on June 8, 1945: "In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a

⁴ See "Veto Power in the United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1946 Vol. II, pp. 630-636.

Editorial Research Reports

matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred."

It was expected, however, that the veto power would be exercised sparingly. As it turned out, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to make free use of the privilege to effectuate Kremlin policy in matters, such as admission of new U.N. members, that were far removed from enforcement of peace.⁵ Meanwhile, the Military Staff Committee, composed of representatives of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members, was struggling to produce agreement on the principles to govern organization of a United Nations Armed Force. Finally, in July 1948, the attempt to resolve persisting differences between the Soviet Union and the other four permanent members was abandoned.⁶ Thus, hobbled by the veto and deprived of the armed forces contemplated by the Charter, the Security Council was left virtually impotent as a keeper of the peace. It was able to urge U.N. members to go to the aid of invaded South Korea, in mid-1950, only because the Soviet delegate was not present in the Security Council chamber to block the decision by a negative vote.

INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Evidence of the weakening effects of the East-West split on the Security Council helped to bring about strengthening of inter-American peace machinery and formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under provisions of the U.N. Charter that recognized the right of member states to make regional defense arrangements. However, it was the Korean experience, in which it was only by chance that U.N. support was obtained for steps to combat aggression, that effectively demonstrated the need to devise new measures for general collective security.

The General Assembly, as a U.N. organ with universal representation and powers of the broadest scope, was the logical body to undertake the search for such measures and to assume the responsibility of carrying them out. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, addressing the Assembly on Sept. 20, 1950, declared that it could and should "organ-

⁵ The Soviet Union has used the veto power 86 times, most recently on Dec. 9, 1958, to block admission to the United Nations of South Vietnam. France has vetoed four resolutions, Great Britain two, and China one. Several negative votes cast by the United States have not counted as vetoes because the resolutions in question did not receive the minimum of seven votes needed for adoption.

⁶ See "United Nations Policing," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. I, pp. 29-33.

ize itself to discharge its responsibility promptly and decisively if the Security Council is prevented from acting."

Adoption of the so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution followed on Nov. 3, 1950. The resolution provided that if the Security Council should be unable to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain peace, because paralyzed by the veto, the General Assembly might be called into emergency session on 24 hours' notice to make recommendations for collective action. Member states were asked, in that connection, to maintain elements of their national forces for possible service as U.N. units. The resolution carried authority only to recommend, not to order, collective action. However, the new peace machinery was applied with a considerable degree of success in the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956, though with no success at all in the simultaneous Hungarian crisis.⁷

Although the Charter had given the General Assembly authority to consider and make recommendations regarding questions relating to international peace and security, so long as the particular question was not currently before the Security Council, it was the Council that was expected to take decisive action. Adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution in effect transferred that function to the General Assembly in cases where the Council found itself unable to act. The Assembly could only make recommendations, not issue orders, but it was not fettered by the veto and its recommendations, when approved by large majorities, carried the powerful force of world public opinion.

The General Assembly, on which every member of the United Nations is represented, is a central organ which has certain overall responsibilities and duties. It admits new members, on the recommendation of the Security Council, and elects the non-permanent members of the Security Council and members of the Economic and Social Council and of the Trusteeship Council. The Assembly is directed by the Charter also to initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international cooperation in a wide variety of fields. Empowered to discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter, it functions primarily as a great forum for debate of international questions. The agenda of the annual autumn sessions, usually attended in the

⁷ See p. 454. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution established a Peace Observation Commission to make on-the-spot surveys in danger areas and a Collective Measures Committee to study organization of resources and manpower for keeping peace.

Editorial Research Reports

opening days by the foreign ministers, invariably ranges far and wide. Assembly decisions on "important questions," such as recommendations for maintenance of peace and admission of new members, have to be approved by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.

GROWTH IN MEMBERSHIP; BLOC VOTING IN ASSEMBLY

Ten new members came into the United Nations in the first five years of its existence.⁸ An East-West deadlock in the Security Council then held up further admissions until 1955, when a compromise formula resulted in the entry of 16 states on the same day. Admission of four additional countries in 1956 lifted the total to an even 80. Ghana in 1957 and Guinea in 1958 brought the membership to the present 82. The Security Council approved the application of Cameroon last Jan. 26 and of Togo on May 31. Several other African countries are scheduled to become independent this year.

Assistant Secretary of State Francis O. Wilcox predicted on June 3 that, in the next two years, almost 20 more new states would emerge in Africa and become members of the United Nations. In that event, the membership roster will pass the hundred mark, and the African countries will constitute close to one-third of the total. When that day comes, if African states vote together, they will need few outside recruits to exercise an effective veto on General Assembly decisions requiring a two-thirds majority.

A tendency to vote in blocs, formed primarily on the basis of common interests but usually following geographical lines, has become increasingly pronounced in the General Assembly. The Soviet bloc is small but solid, with nine votes (10 when Yugoslavia votes with the other Communist states); the 20 Latin American members have remained fairly steadily united; the Afro-Asian group, with 29 votes, is the largest. During the past three sessions the African nations, with nine votes of their own, have been emerging as a separate bloc, destined soon to double or triple in size.⁹ Members of NATO, the British Common-

⁸ One of the ten—Poland—actually was a charter member. No Polish government was formed in time to be represented at the San Francisco conference, but Poland claimed a place reserved for it by signing the Charter as an original member on Oct. 15, 1945.

⁹ The African bloc—composed now of Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic—operates at the United Nations as the "Informal Permanent Machinery of the Independent African States."—Allan A. Michie, "The Growth of an African Power Bloc," *The Reporter*, March 17, 1960, p. 25.

wealth, and other groups may vote in unison on questions directly involving their respective group interests but take a generally independent course on other questions.

A good deal of maneuvering for votes goes on in connection with elections to non-permanent seats on the Security Council and when crucial issues are coming up for decision. The United States used to be able to count on most of the Latin American votes, but rising independence has been apparent in that quarter of late. Competition between Communist and free world leaders for support of the predominantly neutralist Afro-Asian bloc is apt to be lively. With its votes in strong demand, the Afro-Asian bloc has been in position to force compromises on general questions or to exact concessions in matters of such direct concern to some or all of its members as economic aid, colonialism, race relations, or the Algerian war.

Sens. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R Iowa) and Mike Mansfield (D Mont.), members of the U.S. delegation at the 1958 session of the General Assembly, commented unfavorably on the "politicking" in that body. Observing later in a report to the Senate that the General Assembly "cannot order action or bind its membership to compel compliance with its recommendations," the senators added:

The divorce of decision from responsibility to power has led, for example, to a kind of parliamentary busybodyness, with virtually all states involving themselves in almost every issue, small or large, whether their relationship to it is close, remote, or non-existent. It has led to a scramble for the votes of the uninterested states by the interested states with respect to any given issue. It has produced a good deal of logrolling among all states. It has prompted, finally, a frantic search for the lowest common denominator of action in an effort to underscore recommendatory resolutions with impressive majorities.¹⁰

Another criticism of the General Assembly concerns the discrepancies between the voting power and the population of member states. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out several years ago that, with each country having one vote regardless of its size, it was possible to obtain numerical majorities that did not represent "substantial world opinion." Recommendations of the Assembly likewise were "not necessarily backed by a preponderance of world power."¹¹

¹⁰ Report of Bourke B. Hickenlooper and Mike Mansfield, *Observations on the United Nations* (April 30, 1959).

¹¹ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Review of the United Nations Charter* (April 23, 1956), p. 22.

Editorial Research Reports

FUNCTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL

With the increase in power of the General Assembly has come a corresponding rise in the stature of the office of Secretary General.¹² Although the Secretary General is the chief administrative officer of the United Nations, his activities are by no means restricted to administrative duties. He exercises wide influence in international affairs through consultations with U.N. delegates, press conferences, expressions of opinion in annual reports, and notably by diplomatic missions to troubled areas of the globe.

The framers of the Charter, realizing that the Secretary General, more than anyone else, would personify the United Nations, empowered him to exercise a certain amount of independent initiative in the interests of world peace.¹³ Trygve Lie, the first Secretary General, considered it his job to suggest courses of action or methods of solving international problems, but his intervention in highly controversial issues aroused antagonisms which led eventually to his resignation. When Dag Hammarskjöld was elected, it was expected that he would limit his activities largely to administrative matters. The new Secretary General observed on Sept. 14, 1953, five months after he took office:

I do not conceive the role of the Secretary General and the Secretariat as representing what has been called a "third line" in the international debate. Nor is it for him to initiate "compromises" that might enroach upon areas that should be exclusively within the sphere of responsibility of the respective national governments. . . . The relationship of the Secretary General to the governments should be one of a trusted consultant on those considerations following from adherence to the Charter and membership in the United Nations.

It was not long, however, before Hammarskjöld's sphere of action was broadened. Directed by the General Assembly to see what he could do to obtain the release of 11 U.S. airmen captured by Communist China, he decided to go to Peking himself in January 1955, and his mission may have contributed to freeing of the men some months later. At the time of the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956, Hammarskjöld was given major responsibility for creating

¹² The Secretary General is elected for a five-year term by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council. Trygve Lie of Norway, the first Secretary General, resigned on Nov. 10, 1952. Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was elected for the term beginning April 10, 1953, and re-elected for the term beginning on the same date in 1958.

¹³ Article 99 authorizes the Secretary General to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." He thus can secure consideration of a dispute or situation not raised by a member of the Council.

United Nations: 1945-1960

and overseeing the United Nations Emergency Force that was dispatched to the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip; he was entrusted also with the task of arranging for clearing the canal of obstructions.

Since then, the Secretary General has become the world's foremost trouble-shooter, traveling hundreds of thousands of miles to engage in what he calls "quiet diplomacy" or the "diplomacy of reconciliation." His efforts have had a calming effect on numerous disturbed situations, notably in the Middle East. Hammarskjöld's current task is to attempt, on instructions of the Security Council, to persuade South Africa to modify its rigorous measures of racial segregation. He is aided on his diplomatic missions, not only by his own talents for negotiation and conciliation, but also by the fact that the Secretary General, representing no single nation or group of nations, is in position to devote himself with complete impartiality to achieving the purposes of the Charter.

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

One of the purposes of the United Nations, in addition to maintaining peace in the world, is to "achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and [cooperation] in promoting . . . respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all . . ." General charge in this broad region of endeavor was assigned by the Charter to an Economic and Social Council, composed of 18 member states elected by the General Assembly for terms of three years.

ECOSOC was given free rein to make studies, reports, and recommendations, to prepare draft conventions, to set up commissions, to sponsor international conferences, and to enter into agreements with and coordinate the activities of specialized agencies. Prominent among the commissions established by the Council are the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Economic Commission for Africa. Other leading groups include the Commission on Human Rights, the Social Commission, and the Commission on the Status of Women. There are also commissions that keep under constant review international problems relating to such questions as transport and communica-

Editorial Research Reports

tions, population, statistics, narcotic drugs, and international commodity trade. Various standing committees and special bodies complete the picture.

A dozen autonomous international organizations—some of them, like the International Labor Organization and the Universal Postal Union, older than the United Nations itself—have been brought into relationship with the world organization under agreements concluded with Ecosoc.¹⁴ These specialized agencies, covering together a broad range of economic, scientific, social, health and welfare activities, have been widely acclaimed as exemplars of international cooperation and accomplishment of the highest order.

A number of the specialized agencies participate in the program of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries carried on by the United Nations since soon after its founding. The U.N. program has been small in volume of funds expended, compared with American and Soviet economic aid programs, but it has been expanding. The Technical Assistance Board reported, June 5, that 79 governments were expected to contribute \$33.4 million for the work this year—nearly \$4 million more than last year and a record sum to date. The report fixed a goal of \$50 million a year to enable the board "to keep pace with the increasing calls on its services which are now in prospect." The U.N. Special Fund, created late in 1958,¹⁵ is counting on contributions of \$32 million this year for economic development projects in underdeveloped countries. United States contributions make up about 40 per cent of the budgets for both programs.

¹⁴ The specialized agencies include, in addition to the two mentioned, the Food and Agriculture Organization, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund, International Telecommunication Union, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, and World Meteorological Organization.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, though not technically a specialized agency, was established under U.N. auspices. The projected Organization for Trade Cooperation, whose function will be to administer the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is slated to become a specialized agency when and if finally brought into existence.

¹⁵ The Special Fund's managing director is Paul G. Hoffman, who was the first head of the Economic Cooperation (Marshall Plan) Administration (1948-50).

Work to Keep Peace and Curb Aggression

LACK OF UNANIMITY on many matters among the permanent members of the Security Council, and failure to go through with the plans to put armed forces at the disposal of the Council, have not altogether destroyed the ability of the new world organization to perform its primary function. The United Nations has not kept all countries at peace in the past 15 years. Still less has it brought about a sense of international security. But on a few occasions, particularly in the postwar readjustment period, its intervention eased tensions that might have led to war or was influential in stopping hostilities and starting efforts to settle the questions in dispute.

Military resistance to aggression in Korea resulted in full-scale war but upheld the principles of the Charter and by so doing posted a warning to all potential aggressors. The two great powers and one smaller power who resorted to force of arms at Suez had to give way before the force of adverse public opinion expressed through the United Nations. Although the cold war continues to keep the world on edge, the antagonists on both sides show some feeling of accountability to the international organization. The resultant restraining influence of the United Nations may not be enough in a showdown, but it is to the good so far as it goes.

COUNCIL ACTION TO PREVENT OR STOP HOSTILITIES

The first question to come before the Security Council, at its initial session in London in January 1946, was a complaint from Iran of Soviet interference in its internal affairs. Soviet troops, who with British and American troops had been occupying the country during the war, had refused to allow Iranian gendarmes to enter the northern province of Azerbaijan where a revolt had taken place. The Security Council merely recommended that Teheran and Moscow try to settle the dispute by direct negotiation. Two months later, however, when tension had been increased by Russia's failure to meet a March 2 deadline for withdrawal of occupation forces from Iran, Teheran went back to the Council with a charge that the situation endangered international peace. The Council took no immediate decisive action, but retention of the question on its agenda

Editorial Research Reports

doubtless helped to expedite the evacuation of Soviet troops, which was completed early in May 1946.¹⁶

Security Council intervention in the long postwar struggle between the Dutch and the Indonesians was not so immediately effective. When the Netherlands, striving for two years to re-establish authority in the East Indies, initiated an all-out "police action" in mid-1947, the Council brought about a cease-fire and dispatched a Good Offices Committee to negotiate a truce agreement. That agreement, signed Jan. 17, 1948, did not outlast the year. Another Security Council call for a cease-fire, issued on Christmas Eve following Dutch renewal of "police action," had to be repeated at the end of January 1949. The Council then converted its Good Offices Committee into a United Nations Commission for Indonesia, and the commission participated the following autumn in a round-table conference at The Hague which brought independence to Indonesia.¹⁷

It was during this period that the Security Council became involved in what turned out to be a protracted and futile effort to settle the tangled problem of Kashmir. Following invasion by Moslem tribesmen from Pakistan in the autumn of 1947, Kashmir ended a period of indecision as to whether to join India or Pakistan by acceding to India. Clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops followed. Prime Minister Nehru complained to the Security Council on Jan. 1, 1948, that Pakistan had aided the aggressor tribesmen. It was not until April 21 that the Security Council adopted a resolution declaring the dispute a threat to international peace and security and set up a commission to investigate and mediate. The commission visited Kashmir and made proposals for a cease-fire and truce which finally went into effect on Jan. 1, 1949. Failure of repeated U.N. efforts since then to negotiate a permanent settlement, including provisions for a plebiscite recommended by the original commission, have left Kashmir divided along the cease-fire line agreed to in 1949. But hostilities have not been resumed.¹⁸

The bitter enmity between Arabs and Jews which broke into fighting at the birth of Israel in mid-May 1948, and which has manifested itself in various ways since then, has been a constant source of concern to the United Nations

¹⁶ See "Mediterranean Pact and Near East Security," *E.R.R.*, 1940 Vol. I, pp. 288-289.

¹⁷ See "Indonesian Crisis," *E.R.R.*, 1953 Vol. I, pp. 171-173.

¹⁸ See "Kashmir Conflict," *E.R.R.*, 1958 Vol. I, pp. 330-332.

for years. The Security Council, the General Assembly, and a number of U.N. subsidiary bodies have tried earnestly to resolve the quarrel but have succeeded only in containing it.

The General Assembly, which had ordered the partition of Palestine, appointed a U.N. mediator—and the Security Council appointed a Truce Commission—before partition was to take effect on May 15, 1948. When hostilities began at that time, the Council called for an end to military action and finally succeeded in putting a four-week truce into effect on June 11. But fighting was renewed near the end of that period. The Council then declared, July 15, that the conflict menaced world peace. It peremptorily demanded a cease-fire and threatened sanctions if its order was ignored. Arabs as well as Jews complied, and subsequent U.N. mediation and conciliation brought armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states in 1949. No actual peace settlements followed, however, and the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and mixed armistice commissions set up in 1949 to deal with border violations are still functioning.

RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION IN KOREA AND AT SUEZ

Invasion of South Korea by forces from Communist North Korea, June 25, 1950, brought into being the "first international army to fight for collective security."¹⁹ The League of Nations had applied economic sanctions against Fascist Italy when it attacked Ethiopia in 1935, and the United Nations had threatened to apply sanctions in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. But it was only in Korea in 1950 that collective military force actually was set in motion against an aggressor. The United States took the lead in the action and supplied the bulk of the manpower, but 15 other nations contributed military contingents, five additional nations furnished medical units, and many more voiced their support of the effort.

The Security Council, called into session as soon as the gravity of the initial attack had been confirmed, adopted a resolution late in the afternoon of June 25 which (1) proclaimed a breach of the peace, (2) called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of the invaders, and (3) asked all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." Two days later, on June

¹⁹ Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (1964), p. 848.

Editorial Research Reports

27, a second resolution recommended that member states "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."²⁰

A fortuitous combination of circumstances made possible this positive and prompt response to the Communist offensive. The Soviet Union had been boycotting the Council for six months in protest against Nationalist China's occupancy of a seat in that body; it therefore had no delegate present to veto the resolutions. The United States, moreover, had armed forces close to the scene in large numbers and was able to go to the aid of the South Koreans immediately.²¹ And the preponderance of U.S. forces made it possible to agree without hesitation that the U.N. command should go to an American. The war that ensued was intensified toward the end of 1950 by the entry of Chinese "volunteers." The Soviet Union in the meantime having reoccupied its Security Council seat, it fell to the General Assembly formally to brand Red China an aggressor, Feb. 1, 1951, by a vote of 44 to 7.

When the Suez crisis struck six years later, the Security Council was immobilized by British and French vetoes. At a meeting of the Council on Oct. 30, 1956, a day after Israeli forces had invaded Egypt, two resolutions calling for a cease-fire were blocked by Great Britain and France on the ground that the Council could not act fast enough to protect "many thousands of British and French nationals" in Egypt and assure "safe passage in the Suez Canal." Anglo-French intervention, they maintained, could be "the only effective action in a very grave situation," and they proceeded to put their plans for invasion into effect.

The General Assembly thereupon convened in emergency session, under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, and on Nov. 2 urged an immediate cease-fire and prompt withdrawal of invading forces. The appeals were accepted by all four of the countries involved, but not until Nov. 6, after British and French troops had secured key positions.²² In the early hours of Nov. 5 the General Assembly had

²⁰ The Council could only recommend, not order, because the special military agreements that would have placed armed forces directly at its disposal had not been concluded.

²¹ The timetable of events from June 25 to June 27, 1950, shows the United States moving independently a step ahead of the Security Council but in conformity with the resolutions it subsequently approved. See "United Nations Policing," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. I, pp. 36-37.

²² British and French bombers attacked Egyptian points from Oct. 31 to Nov. 5, and troop landings began on the latter date.

voted unanimously to establish a U.N. Emergency Force for the Middle East, not to stop the fighting, but to patrol the troubled areas after a cease-fire. UNEF's 6,000 troops, recruited from the armies of 10 of the smaller countries,²³ began landing in Egypt in mid-November. Shortly before Christmas 1956, withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed, and UNEF units, replaced in the Canal Zone by Egyptian troops, moved across the Sinai desert behind the withdrawing Israeli forces and took up posts along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, where they are still stationed today.²⁴

INABILITY TO HELP HUNGARY'S FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Outcome of the simultaneous Hungarian crisis of October and November 1956 was less happy. When the Security Council was requested by the United States, Great Britain and France to discuss "the critical situation in Hungary," the Soviet delegate called the revolt a domestic matter and denied reports of a Soviet march on Hungary. Upon confirmation that the Russians were attacking in force, the Council met at 3 A.M., Nov. 4, and voted 10 to 1 for a resolution condemning the attack and calling on the Secretary General to arrange an on-the-spot inquiry. The single negative vote was a Soviet veto, but the General Assembly adopted a like resolution later the same day by a vote of 50 to 8.

Subsequent Assembly resolutions demanded (Nov. 9) that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops; demanded (Dec. 4) that the Hungarian government, which had barred U.N. observers, be given a "final chance" to admit them; and condemned (Dec. 12) the Soviet Union's "violation of the Charter . . . in depriving Hungary of its liberty and independence and the Hungarian people of their fundamental rights." The General Assembly on Sept. 14, 1957, overwhelmingly endorsed the report of a five-nation investigating committee which described the Hungarian revolt as "a spontaneous national uprising" resulting from "long-standing grievances" and not fomented by exiles or by Western imperialists.

The Assembly called on the Soviet and Hungarian gov-

²³ Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia.

²⁴ Secretary General Hammarskjöld said in a message to UNEF troops: "You are the soldiers of peace in the first international force of its kind. . . . You have come from distant homelands not to fight a war but to serve peace and justice and order under the authority of the United Nations."

Editorial Research Reports

ernments to "desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people," and it named the outgoing president of the Assembly as its special representative to seek compliance with its various resolutions on Hungary. However, Budapest continued to refuse entry to any official representative of the United Nations. In the case of Hungary the world organization found itself as helpless as the freedom fighters who had had hopes, however unrealistic, of armed assistance from the free world.

SOVIET UNION'S CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES

The United States, like the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, has had its turn before the bar of the Security Council. Moscow on April 18, 1958, demanded an immediate meeting of the Council to consider a "grave threat" to world peace—flights of U.S. Air Force planes "with atomic and hydrogen bombs aboard" across the Arctic in the direction of Soviet territory. Washington denied that the flights over the polar regions were provocative and explained that procedures prescribed in case of an actual alert would prevent U.S. bombers from getting anywhere near Soviet territory without additional orders directly from the President. In the Security Council on April 21 the Soviet representative repeated the charges, but he withdrew a resolution demanding an end to the flights when it became apparent it would be rejected. At a later meeting, May 2, 1958, the Soviet Union cast the only vote for a new resolution calling on this country to stop the flights, and the only vote (a veto) against an American resolution to establish an Arctic international inspection zone.

Soviet Russia haled the United States before the Security Council a second time, following the recent U-2 incident, to answer charges of "aggressive acts . . . creating a threat to universal peace." After four days of at times acrimonious debate, May 23-26, the Council rejected, 7-2, a Soviet resolution denouncing incursions of U.S. aircraft into the airspace of other states and demanding an immediate end to such flights. Only Poland joined the Soviet Union in support of the resolution.

Proposals to Strengthen United Nations

THE VETO POWER has been a central element in the development of the United Nations up to now. Through its use to bar qualified applicants for membership, it affected for years the very composition of the world organization. Blamed as the principal obstacle to effective operation of the peace enforcement machinery, it has given rise to important changes of procedure and to suggestions for further procedural changes and for Charter amendments to ameliorate the existing situation. Fear of the veto power, finally, has encouraged a movement away from the United Nations, in such matters as disarmament, where unfailing methods of control are indispensable.

Yet provision for exercise of a veto by permanent members of the Security Council was, as earlier noted, essential to adoption of the Charter in the first place, and withdrawal of the privilege is not at present foreseeable. What in substance has caused the trouble is not the veto power itself but the split between East and West that became apparent almost as soon as the United Nations came into being. Exercise of the veto reflects the tensions and divisions of the cold war. If it were possible to end that conflict, the veto power in all probability would become no more than a minor irritant. And realization of that general agreement among the great powers that was hoped for at San Francisco would automatically strengthen the organization.

VOTING REFORMS; BAR TO REVISION OF CHARTER

The General Assembly, already disturbed by frequent resort to the veto privilege in the Security Council, adopted a resolution in April 1949 recommending that the Council classify decisions on some 35 specified types of questions as procedural and therefore not subject to veto. The resolution recommended also that the permanent members seek agreement among themselves to forbear to exercise the veto on certain clearly substantive decisions such as those on admission of new members. However, such suggestions for voluntary limitation on use of the veto made no impression on the Security Council at that time.²⁵

²⁵ President Eisenhower, replying Jan. 12, 1958, to a Soviet bid for summit talks, suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union subscribe to an agreement not to use the veto "to prevent the Security Council from proposing methods for the pacific settlement of disputes."

Editorial Research Reports

Meanwhile, the evident weakness of U.N. peace machinery before the gathering Communist menace in Europe had led to creation of NATO as a regional defense organization. A proposal to strengthen peace enforcement through a sort of world-wide NATO was advanced in July 1949 by Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D Ill.) and the late Sen. Elbert D. Thomas (D Utah). They asked Congress to adopt a resolution pledging support of a self-defense pact to be concluded under Article 51 of the Charter (recognizing the right of collective self-defense) and open to all U.N. members. The signatories of such a pact were to agree, in event of a Security Council stalemate, to go to the aid of a victim of aggression if so requested by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly which included the votes of three of the five permanent members of the Council.

Plans for restricting exercise of the veto or for circumventing the veto have been supplemented by proposals for a direct assault on the problem through amendment of the Charter. Some of the proposals would eliminate the veto but usually with the requirement of more than a simple majority of votes for important decisions. Other proposals would retain the principle of the veto but require the negative vote of more than one permanent member to prevent a decision.

Entry into the United Nations of a still growing number of newly independent small states has created a different kind of voting problem. The privilege of veto was considered appropriate for permanent members of the Security Council on the ground that their military and industrial power would be called on to bear the burden of restraining violators of the peace. Now it is being asked whether, by the same token, a host of small nations, in many cases with limited populations and limited developed resources, should be in position to sway General Assembly decisions that can be carried out only by or largely at the expense of a few big nations.

Suggestions accordingly have been advanced to substitute for the system of one vote for each nation a system of votes weighted by some such standard as population, military strength, gross national product, or U.N. financial contributions of the respective members. Weighted voting naturally would be opposed by the small nations. It is opposed also by the Secretary General. Hammarskjold gave

the opinion at a news conference, June 2, that it would "go against a very basic idea in the Charter." He asserted that the advantages of equal voting far outweighed its disadvantages.

There are formidable practical obstacles to adoption of any voting or veto reform that requires amendment of the Charter. Amendments to the Charter have to be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, or by a two-thirds vote of a general conference of members called for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,²⁶ and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council. The big-power veto thus applies on Charter amendments as well as Security Council decisions.

The Soviet Union is understood to oppose a general review of the Charter until Communist China gains representation in the United Nations.²⁷ Soviet Premier Khrushchev said at a news conference on June 5 that "We do not even think of submitting proposals for a revision of the Charter." Khrushchev insisted that retention of the veto power was necessary until the number of Communist countries more nearly approached the number of capitalist countries. Otherwise, he said, "the United States, on which many countries depend, would succeed in forcing through their solutions." Secretary General Hammarskjöld observed last March 3 that "What is needed is not a revision of the Charter; what is needed is a revision of the world situation."

CONTROVERSIAL QUESTION OF ADMITTING RED CHINA

Peking's Communist regime has laid claim to China's seat in the United Nations ever since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. But Red China still stands branded as an aggressor under the General Assembly resolution of Feb. 1, 1951, and membership in the United Nations is supposed to be open only to "peace-loving countries which accept the obligations contained in the pres-

²⁶ The Charter provided that a proposal to call such a conference was to be placed on the agenda of the tenth annual session of the General Assembly, if no conference had been held before that time. The Assembly in 1955 voiced approval of a Charter review conference "at an appropriate time" and appointed a committee on which all members were represented to consider questions of time, place, and procedure. A committee report recommending postponement of further consideration of the question until the 1961 session was approved by the Assembly last Nov. 20.

²⁷ The Soviet bloc at the last Assembly session opposed, pending admission of Red China, a proposal to appoint a committee to negotiate an agreement to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The Assembly voted, Nov. 20, to put the question over to its 1960 session. Amendment of the Charter to give India a permanent seat on the Security Council has been widely advocated.

Editorial Research Reports

ent Charter." The question of Chinese representation nevertheless has come up annually in the General Assembly, only to be as regularly postponed—for the ninth successive time last Sept. 22, by a vote of 44 to 29.

The relatively large number of countries favoring admission of Red China reflects the feeling that the United Nations itself will suffer if it continues indefinitely to bar the biggest nation in the world, with more than 600 million people, from its councils. The question, of course, is complicated by the fact that Nationalist China, though actually representing only the 11 million inhabitants of Formosa, is recognized in the United Nations as the representative of all China. Its possession of a permanent seat in the Security Council is plainly anomalous under present circumstances, but the difficulties of effecting a change are obvious.²⁸

The United States from the beginning has been in the forefront of opposition to any alteration of the existing situation. Sen. John F. Kennedy (D Mass.), leading contender for the Democratic presidential nomination, said on the Senate floor, June 14, that Red China should not be recognized by this country or admitted to the United Nations until there had been a change in its "belligerent attitude." Kennedy observed, however, that the present policy had "failed dismally" to weaken the Communists. He suggested that a first step toward improving "communications with mainland China" might be to find some way to bring Red China into the nuclear test ban talks at Geneva. There has been widening recognition that any test ban or general disarmament agreement may be dangerously incomplete if the Peking government is not a party to it.

FAR GOALS OF DISARMAMENT AND U.N. POLICE FORCE

The U.N. Charter, while authorizing the General Assembly to consider "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments," made the Security Council "responsible for formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments." To perform that duty, the Council on Feb. 13, 1947, set up a Commission for Conventional Armaments. More than a year before, on Jan. 24, 1946, the first resolution adopted

²⁸ See "Representation in the United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1950 Vol. II, pp. 707-714, and "Red China and United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1954 Vol. II, pp. 679-696.

by the General Assembly had created the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, of which Bernard M. Baruch became chairman, to tackle a control problem not contemplated when the Charter was framed. The efforts of the Atomic Energy Commission having come to a dead end, jurisdiction over both atomic and conventional arms regulation was lodged, in January 1952, in a new Disarmament Commission.

Long efforts by the new commission and a smaller sub-committee to reconcile opposing East-West viewpoints on a wide range of disarmament proposals became so bogged down in September 1957 that the whole undertaking had to be virtually suspended. It was rescued in the summer of 1959 by a decision of the Big Four foreign ministers, later endorsed by the U.N. Disarmament Commission, to entrust further negotiations to an independent 10-nation conference, in which East and West would be evenly represented. That parley, which opened at Geneva last March 15, has shown little sign of progress. Separate negotiations for a ban on testing of nuclear weapons, begun at Geneva among representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union on Oct. 31, 1958, and still continuing, are regarded more hopefully.²⁹

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, addressing the National Press Club on Feb. 18, four weeks before the general disarmament conference convened, said it must be an objective of the struggle for general disarmament to create "certain universally accepted rules of law which, if followed, would prevent all nations from attacking other nations." Such rules, he asserted, should be "backed by a world court and by effective means of enforcement—that is, by international armed force." Given these conditions, national armed forces could be reduced, under safeguards, "to the point where no single nation or group of nations could effectively oppose this enforcement of international law by international machinery."

Efforts to strengthen the Permanent Court of International Justice, judicial arm of the United Nations, have had slow going,³⁰ and until recently the Soviet Union, while advocating complete disarmament, had professed to see no need for an international force to do police duty in a

²⁹ See "Struggle for Disarmament," *E.R.R.*, 1960 Vol. I, pp. 139-156, and "Nuclear Test Ban," *E.R.R.*, 1959 Vol. I, pp. 350-356.

³⁰ See "World Court and International Law," *E.R.R.*, 1959 Vol. I, pp. 443-449.

Editorial Research Reports

disarmed world. But revised Soviet disarmament proposals submitted to the United Nations on June 2 accepted the idea of a U.N. force to maintain peace and security after total disarmament had gone into effect. The proposed force, however, would be made up of national police or militia contingents subject to call by the Security Council. The veto power, therefore, would apply on use of the force.

Existence of the veto power in the Security Council was responsible in part for the original Baruch plan to put control of atomic energy exclusively in the hands of an international Atomic Development Authority in which there would be "no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes."³¹ The Western powers similarly today have proposed an independent veto-free International Disarmament Organization to control enforcement of a disarmament agreement, and another independent organization to police a nuclear test ban. This tendency to bypass the United Nations has been deplored by Secretary General Hammarskjöld. He said on May 5 that if an international police force was to be set up under a general disarmament agreement, the United Nations itself should take a new look at the Charter provisions for such a force.

³¹ Bernard M. Baruch at opening meeting of U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946.



